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DIVORCE BARGAINING: THE 
LIMITS ON PRIVATE ORDERINGt 
Robert H. Mnookin* 
In an article published in the Yale Law Journal, I suggested 
an alternative perspective for family law scholars concerned with 
divorce. 1 It emphasized negotiation, not adjudication; private or-
dering, not regulation. This change in emphasis seemed timely, 
if not overdue. Available evidence has long shown that the over-
whelming majority of divorcing couples resolve the distribu-
tional questions concerning marital property, alimony, child sup-
port, and custody without bringing any contested issue to court 
for adjudication. Therefore, the primary impact of the legal sys-
tem falls not on the small number of contested cases, but in-
stead on the far greater number of divorcing couples outside the 
courtroom who bargain in the shadow of the law. Thus, my em-
phasis is on negotiation not adjudication. 
Other evidence supported an emphasis on private ordering, 
not regulation. Since 1966, the American legal system has under-
gone a radical transformation that still continues. Before the no-
fault revolution, divorce law attempted to restrict private order-
ing severely. The state asserted broad authority to define when 
divorce was appropriate, to structure the economic relationship 
of the spouses, and to regulate their relationship to their chil-
dren. The pretense of regulation has largely disappeared. Ameri-
can law now recognizes explicitly that a primary function of law 
at the time of divorce is to provide a framework within which 
divorcing couples may exercise great freedom to determine 
themselves their postdissolution rights and responsibilities. Di-
vorce no longer requires a judicial determination of a "marital 
offense." With respect to spousal support and marital property, 
most states permit a .couple to make binding and final agree-
t This Article is based on a paper originally presented at the Fourth Annual 
Conference of the International Society of Family Law, held at Harvard University in 
June 1982 which was published in THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT: COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 364-383 (J. Eekelaar and S. Katz eds. 1984). Reprinted by 
permission of Butterworth & Co. (Canada) Ltd .. 
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B., 1964, LL.B., 1968, Harvard University. 
1. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Di-
vorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
1015 
1016 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:4 
ments-i.e., not subject to later modification by a court. For 
those decisions that directly affect children-child support, cus-
tody, and visitation-parents lack the formal power to make 
their own law. American courts typically are required to "re-
view" the parental arrangement, which later can be modified in 
light of substantial changes in circumstances. But absent a dis-
pute, divorcing parents actually have the power to make their 
own deals. Typically, courts rubber-stamp separation agree-
ments, even in cases involving children. Moreover, legislative 
changes approving joint custody and assorted appellate rulings 
increasingly acknowledge that the parties to a divorce should 
have a very broad latitude to decide for themselves by agree-
ment the distributional questions posed by divorce. Indeed, the 
current interest in divorce mediation underlines the increasing 
emphasis on private ordering, for a mediator helps the parties 
reach a negotiated agreement but does not impose an outcome. 
But is private ordering a good thing? This paper defends the 
proposition that it is, and that the primary goal of the state at 
the time of a divorce is to facilitate the process by which the 
parties themselves decide the consequences of the divorce. I 
should make clear from the outset that I am unwilling to defend 
the absurd proposition that the state should simply withdraw all 
resources from the dispute settlement process, and leave it to 
the divorcing spouses to work things out on their own, unas-
sisted by any professional help or legal protection. To the con-
trary, my use of the term "private ordering" was never meant to 
imply either (1) that law and the legal system are unimportant; 
or (2) that no important social interests exist in how the process 
works or in the fairness of its outcomes. Consequently, an ade-
quate defense of private ordering requires two prongs: first, a 
justification of why generally the legal system should permit 
(and indeed encourage) divorcing couples to work out their own 
arrangements; and second, a justification for imposing some lim-
its on private ordering. When I began thinking about this article, 
I was confident that I could provide the first part-the general 
defense. But I was less confident that I could give reasons for 
limiting private ordering that would not in the process sabotage 
this defense. 
Defining the limits of private ordering is obviously relevant 
both to policy makers and those involved professionally in di-
vorce bargaining on a day-to-day basis. The issue arises in many 
different ways. Should mediators, for example, consider only 
whether a deal is made? To what extent should lawyers repre-
senting individual clients be prepared to "sign off'' with respect 
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to an agreement that substantially differs from what a court 
would most likely impose? Should courts review divorce settle-
ments, and if so, what principles should inform that review? 
Should the state permit divorcing couples to agree to an out-
come that a court would not order? Under what circumstances 
should a party be able to object to the enforcement of an earlier 
agreement? When should persons not parties to the bargain 
(e.g., grandparents, children, the welfare department) be able to 
set aside an agreement, even if the parties to the bargain do not 
object? 
My purpose here is neither to address these specific policy 
questions nor to specify the precise procedural and substantive 
rules that should constrain private ordering. Instead this article 
addresses what I see as the underlying question: should limits 
exist to private ordering at the time of divorce, and if so, why? I 
hope to answer this question in a way that provides a framework 
helpful to those concerned with policy. 
The Article proceeds as follows. I first briefly present a general 
justification for private ordering. I then explore the reasons that 
limits are necessary. I argue that three justifications exist (or 
limiting private ordering, each of which may warrant procedural 
or substantive safeguards. The first concerns the issue of capac-
ity. Are divorcing spouses able to make deliberate and informed 
judgments necessary to decide whether a particular agreement is 
in their interests? The second concerns relative bargaining 
power. I will show how, even against a backdrop of just substan-
tive entitlements and fair procedures, "one-sided" settlements 
can nevertheless result. The third concerns externalities, which 
arise because divorce bargains can often have important conse-
quences for unrepresented third parties, most conspicuously the 
children. Using these three concepts-capacity, relative bargain-
ing power, and externalities-I will provide a framework for un-
derstanding how one spouse can sometimes take advantage of 
the other and why some divorce bargains are reached that may 
not warrant enforcement. In short, I hope to provide a theory 
that in essence justifies a presumption that favors private order-
ing, while also providing guidance about the reasons some safe-
guards are appropriate. 
I. THE ADVANTAGES OF PRIVATE ORDERING 
Let me begin with the arguments to support the presumption 
in favor of private ordering. The core justification is rooted in 
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notions of human liberty. The liberal ideal that individuals have 
fundamental rights, and should freely choose to make of their 
lives what they wish supports private ordering. In Charles 
Fried's words, a regime of law that "respects the dispositions in-
dividuals make of their rights, carries to its logical conclusion 
the liberal premise that individuals have rights."2 Professor 
Fried has eloquently defended on a nonutilitarian basis the prin-
ciple that "persons may impose on themselves [through con-
tracts] obligations where none existed before."3 He argues that 
"the capacity to form true and rational judgments and act on 
them is the heart of moral personality and the basis of a per-
son's claim to respect as a moral being."" Thus, as a general 
proposition, enforcement of agreements made at the time of di-
vorce give expression to a "free man's rational decision about 
how to dispose of what is his, how to bind himself."11 
Private ordering is also justified on grounds of efficiency.6 Or-
dinarily, the parties themselves are in the best position to evalu-
ate the comparative advantages of alternative arrangements. 
Each spouse, in the words of John Stuart Mill, "is the person 
most interested· in his own well-being . . . with respect to his 
own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or wo-
man has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those 
that can be possessed by anyone else."7 Through negotiations, 
opportunities exist for making both spouses better off than ei-
ther would be if a court or some third party simply imposed a 
result.8 A consensual solution, by definition, more likely con-
forms with the preferences of each spouse than would a result 
imposed by a court. Parental preferences often vary with regard 
to money and child-rearing responsibilities. Through negotia-
2. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 2 (1981). There are of course competing theories of 
contract law not rooted in notions of liberty. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, (1979); Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Con-
tract and Tort Law, with Special References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bar-
gaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1982). 
3. Id. at 1. 
4. Id. at 78. 
5. Id. 
6. I use efficiency here in the economic sense of Pareto efficiency. Such efficiency 
requires an outcome where neither party can be made better off without making the 
other contracting party worse off. 
7. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY, in ON LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 68 (R. 
McCallum ed. 1947) (1st ed. London 1859). 
8. Note, however, that divorce itself no longer requires the consent of both spouses. 
Situations arise, of course, where one spouse may not want a divorce, while the other 
does. No-fault divorce laws now permit one spouse unilaterally to create a ground for 
dissolution. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 954. 
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tions, a greater likelihood exists that divorcing spouses can di-
vide money and child-rearing responsibilities to reflect their own 
individual preferences. 
Finally, obvious and substantial savings occur when a couple 
can resolve the distributional consequences of divorce without 
resort to formal adjudication. The financial cost of litigation, 
both private and public, lessens. A negotiated settlement allows 
the parties to avoid the pain of the formal adversarial proceed-
ings and the risks and uncertainties of litigation, which may in-
volve all-or-nothing consequences. Given the substantial delays 
that often characterize contested judicial proceedings, agreement 
often saves time and allows each spouse to proceed with his or 
her life. In short, against a backdrop of fair standards in the 
shadow of which a couple bargains, divorcing couples should 
have very broad powers to make their own arrangements. Addi-
tionally, significant limitations are inconsistent with the prem-
ises of no-fault divorce. The state should encourage parties to 
settle the distributional consequences of divorce for themselves. 
The state should also provide an efficient and fair mechanism 
for enforcing such agreements and for settling disputes when the 
parties are unable to agree. 
IJ. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LIMITATIONS ON PRIVATE ORDERING 
A. Capacity 
On an abstract level, I find the general defense of private or-
dering both appealing and persuasive. But it is premised on the 
notion that divorce bargaining involves rational, self-interested 
individuals-that the average adult has the intelligence and ex-
perience to make a well-informed judgment concerning the de-
sirability of entering into a particular divorce settlement. Given 
the tasks facing an individual at the time of divorce, and the 
characteristics of the relationship between divorcing spouses, 
there are reasons to fear that this may not always be the case. 
Informed bargaining requires a divorcing spouse to assess his 
or her own preferences concerning alternative arrangements. 
Radical changes in life circumstances complicate such assess-
ments. Within a short period of time, separation and divorce 
often subject spouses to the stresses of many changes. 
"[S]pouses need to adjust to new living arrangements, new jobs, 
new financial burdens, new patterns of parenting, and new con-
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ditions of social and sexual life."0 It may be particularly difficult 
for a parent to assess custodial alternatives. The past will supply 
a very incomplete guide to the future. Preferences may stem 
from past experiences in which child-rearing tasks were per-
formed in an ongoing two-parent family, and dissolution or di-
vorce inevitably alters this division of responsibilities. Child-
rearing may now have new advantages or disadvantages for the 
parents' own needs. A parent interested in dating may find the 
child an intrusion in a way that the child never was during mar-
riage. Because children and parents both change, and changes 
occur unpredictably, projecting parental preferences for custody 
into the future presents a formidable task. Nevertheless, most 
parents have some self-awareness, however imperfect, and no 
third party (such as a judge) is likely to have better information 
about a parent's tastes, present or future. 
Separation often brings in its wake psychological turmoil and 
substantial emotional distress that can make deliberative and 
well-informed judgments unlikely. It can arouse "feelings about 
the (former) spouse, such as love, hate, bitterness, guilt, anger, 
envy, concern, and attachment; feelings about the marriage, such 
as regret, disappointment, bitterness, sadness, and failure; and 
more general feelings such as failure, depression, euphoria, relief, 
guilt, lowered self-esteem, and lowered self-confidence."10 Isolini 
Ricci has suggested that for many individuals "the emotions of 
ending a marriage" characteristically go through five stages dur-
ing a two or three year period.11 She claims that during the first 
three stages, an otherwise competent person may occasionally 
have seriously impaired judgment. She suggests that the pre-
separation stage is often marked by "anxiety, depression, hostil-
ity, and recurring illness." The separation stage can bring with it 
three dangerous side effects: "poor judgment; accident and ill-
ness-proneness, poor reflex action; and depression." The third 
stage, which follows the separation, arouses strong emotions that 
are "both natural and nasty." "Emotional roller-coasters are 
9. Kresse!, Lopez-Morillas, Weinglass & Deutsch, Professional Intervention in Di-
vorce: The Views of Lawyers, Psychotherapists, and Clergy, in DIVORCE AND SEPARATION: 
CONTEXT, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES 256 (1979) [hereinafter cited as DIVORCE AND SEPA· 
RATION] (article originally in 2 J. DIVORCE 119 (1978)). 
10. Spanier & Casto, Adjustment to Separation and Divorce: A Qualitative Analy-
sis, in DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, supra note 9, at 213. 
11. I. RICCI, MoM's HousE/DAD's HousE 70 (1980). According to Ricci, these stages 
are: (1) the period just before the actual separation-the beginning of a crisis period; (2) 
the time of separation-a crisis period; (3) the eruption of strong emotions-a crisis pe-
riod; (4) the adult adolescence of testing new roles and new identity; and (5) the more 
mature identity and a new lifestyle. 
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common at this stage, causing many people to feel permanent 
emotional instability." According to Ricci, "this is the worst pos-
sible time to make any permanent decisions-especially legal 
ones. Thinking and believing the worst about each other is one 
of the chief hazards of this stage, and such thoughts, exagger-
ated and extended, can lead to serious complications. m 2 
Such emotional turmoil may prevent for a time any negotiated 
settlement. Or it may lead to a settlement that a party later 
regrets. 
Frequently, the partner who wishes to end the marriage 
feels guilt at abandoning the spouse. Once the initiator· 
finally broaches the topic of divorce, continued guilt, 
combined with the equally strong desire to leave, may 
produce a virulent form of the "settlement at any cost" 
mentality. At the same time, the spouse who wishes to 
keep the marriage may escalate demands, motivated by 
feelings of humiliation and anger, combined with pros-
pects of a bleak and unchosen future. Unreasonable de-
mands may also be a means to prolong the marriage and 
ultimately prevent the marital breakup. 
An opposite pattern was also noted by several of our 
respondents: guilt in the initiator may be expressed as 
anger directed at the non-initiator, in whom feelings of 
diminished self-worth may inhibit the ability to bargain 
constructively, or produce an abject acceptance of almost 
any terms. A settlement may thus be quickly arrived at 
whose inequitable and unworkable nature may not be ap-
parent until several years and several court fights later.13 
Some might think that the stresses and emotional turmoil of 
separation and divorce undermine the essential premise of pri-
vate ordering-individuals' capacity to make deliberate judg-
ments. I disagree. For most persons the emotional upheaval is 
transitory, and the stresses are an inevitable consequence of 
having to make a new life. Temporary incapacity does not justify 
state paternalism for an extended period of time. Nonetheless, 
safeguards may be necessary, and the wooden application of the 
traditional contract defense of "incompetence," which is ex-
12. The adversarial nature of our legal system can make matters worse by providing 
an outlet for these feelings. "Even the most conciliatory and mediative attorneys find it 
difficult to convince out-of-control clients that the legal process is not the appropriate 
arena for their intense feelings of fear, spite, or anger." Id. at 75. 
13. Kresse!, Lopez-Morillas, Weinglass & Deutsch, supra note 9, at 256. 
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tremely limited, may provide insufficient protection.14 More re-
cent contract scholarship suggests a theory that respects the 
ideal of individual autonomy and the efficiency of private order-
ing, and avoids the unfairness of bargains that exploit 
incapacity. 
Professor Eisenberg recently suggested a concept of "transac-
tional incapacity" to capture the notion that "an individual may 
be of average intelligence and yet may lack the aptitude, experi-
ence, or judgmental ability to make a deliberative and well-in-
formed judgment concerning the desirability of entering into a 
given complex transaction."111 Eisenberg's concern was with situ-
ations where one party exploits the other party's incapacity to 
deal with a complex transaction, "by inducing . . . a bargain 
that a person who had capacity to deal with the transactions 
probably would not make. "18 In such circumstances, Eisenberg 
suggests that neither fairness nor efficiency support application 
of the principle that courts should support a private bargain to 
its full extent. Unfairness arises because it violates conventional 
moral standards "to make a bargain on unfair terms by exploit-
ing ... incapacity." Moreover, "[t]he maxim that a promisor is 
the best judge of his own utility can have little application: by 
hypothesis, the promisor is not able to make a well-informed 
judgment concerning the transaction."17 
Although Professor Eisenberg's concern was with the complex-
ity of a particular transaction, and my concern is with a party's 
temporarily diminished capacity because of his or her emotional 
state, the concept of "transactional incapacity" can be applied 
by way of analogy. When one spouse knows or has reason to 
know of the diminished capacity of the other spouse, and ex-
ploits this incapability, a court should refuse to enforce the 
agreement. Proof of exploitation, however, is essential. And a 
critical question is how one tests for exploitation. I would re-
quire a showing that the terms of the agreement considered as a 
whole fall outside the range of what would have been acceptable 
to a competent person at the time of the settlement.18 By pro-
14. Ordinary contract principles would require extreme impairment of cognitive ca-
pacity before allowing a defense of incompetence. Incompetence traditionally required a 
showing that a party has childlike abilities, or is mentally disabled in a severe way. See 2 
S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 256 (1959). 
15. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 763 
(1982). 
16. Id. at 764. 
17. Id. at 765. 
18. This test would permit the reviewing court to take into account the possible 
transaction costs. A fully competent spouse might accept less than the expected value of 
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viding a remedy only if a spouse exploited the other spouse's 
incapacity by securing an unusually one-sided bargain, this test 
will not create uncertainty in most cases. Many divorced spouses 
may in retrospect think that they unwisely accepted some provi-
sion, and some might successfully show a lack of deliberative 
judgment, but few will successfully show that the settlement as a 
whole would have been unacceptable to a competent person. 
Any additional uncertainty created for parties making "out of 
the ordinary" deals may not constitute a bad thing. 19 Moreover, 
I would create a presumption against the application of this di-
minished capacity doctrine in any cases where the party making 
the claim was represented by counsel. Indeed, as Eisenberg sug-
gests, "[i]f a party who has been urged, fairly and in good faith, 
to seek advice, fails to do so, the doctrine of transactional inca-
pacity would normally not apply, because the element of ex-
ploitation would be lacking" [at least where the party has suffi-
cient capacity] "to understand the importance of getting 
advice. "20 
A second prophylactic to guard against transitory diminished 
capacity would involve a "cooling-off'' period, during which ei-
ther party would be free to rescind a settlement agreement. In a 
commercial context, this period is often very short-typically 
three days. In the divorce context, I would make it considerably 
longer-perhaps thirty to sixty days. Like any safeguard, a cool-
ing-off period has costs. Some agreements may come apart even 
though they involve no exploitation whatsoever, simply because 
of ambivalence or a change of heart. Moreover, a party may stra-
tegically use the cooling-off period. A tentative agreement may 
be reached, only to be later rescinded, in order to wear an oppo-
nent down. Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to have a fixed, 
reasonable "boundary line" as a rough estimate of the time 
within which the "transitory state of acquiescence" induced by 
guilt or anxiety might be expected to lapse. In cases where both 
parties have assigned counsel, it might be possible to have a 
shorter period. 21 In any event, a cooling-off period might well 
an adjudicated judgment. 
19. If independent counsel "signed off," a court should refrain from subsequent inter-
vention to rescind. Perhaps the injured party should have a malpractice claim against 
the lawyer in an extreme case. 
20. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 770 n.78. 
21. Eisenberg discusses the case of "unfair persuasion" which he defines to mean 
"the use of bargaining methods that seriously impair the free and competent exercise of 
judgment and produce a state of acquiescence that the promisee knows or should know is 
likely to be highly transitory." Id at 733-74. Under traditional contract rules, "undue 
influence" was a ground of recision, but it required a pre-existing relationship between 
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obviate the need for much substantive regulation by courts on 
the ground of transactional incapacity. 
B. Unequal Bargaining Power 
A second possible justification for imposing limits on private 
ordering lies in a simple idea. In negotiations between two com-
petent adults, if great disparity in bargaining power exists, some 
bargains may arise that are unconscionably one-sided. 22 The no-
tion of bargaining power has intuitive appeal, but defies easy 
definition. Moreover, to speak of "unequal" bargaining power 
implies that one can know when parties have "equal" bargaining 
power. Without a complete theory of negotiations, it is hard to 
give precise substantive content to the notion of bargaining 
power, much less precisely define or measure "relative bargain-
ing power." Nonetheless, by briefly analyzing the five elements 
of the bargaining model I described in an earlier article, it is 
possible to suggest why one divorcing spouse may be seen as 
having greater ability to bring about an outcome favorable to 
himself or herself. 
First, bargaining is influenced by the partners' respective legal 
endowments. The legal rules governing marital property, ali-
mony, child support, and custody give each spouse certain 
claims based on what each would get if the case goes to trial. In 
other words, the outcome the law will impose if no agreement is 
the parties where "one party is under the domination of another or by virtue of the 
relationship between them is justified in assuming that the other party will not act in a 
manner inconsistent with his welfare." See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 497 
(1932). The commentary suggests that the relationship of husband and wife might ordi-
-narily fall within this rule, but that it would depend on a question of fact whether "the 
relationship in a particular case is such as to give one party dominance over the other, or 
put him in a position where words of persuasion have undue weight." Query whether the 
relationship between a divorcing husband and wife would often justify a party's belief 
that "the other party will not act in a manner inconsistent with his welfare." See Auclair 
v. Auclair, 72 Cal. App. 2d 791, 165 P.2d 527 (1946) (finding that husband and wife have 
fiduciary obligations as a matter of law). In all events, Eisenberg suggests a doctrine of 
"unfair persuasion" that should be applied irrespective of the prior relationship between 
the parties, but "only where the promisee creates and exploits a state of acquiescence 
that he knows or should know is only transitory." Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 777. He 
supports a "cooling-off'' period within which the transitory state of acquiescence can 
normally be expected to disappear. Id. at 776-77. 
22. Temporary incapacity is arguably a special case of unequal bargaining power. If 
one party is competent and the other is not, it would certainly seem that they have 
unequal bargaining power. There are nonetheless distinct problems with this because it 
is certainly possible that the two parties might each be entirely competent and capable 
of exercising deliberative judgment, where one would nonetheless conclude that they had 
very disproportionate bargaining power. 
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reached gives each parent certain bargaining chips-an endow-
ment of sorts. These endowments themselves can create unequal 
bargaining power. For example, other things ·being equal, in a 
state where a tender years presumption exists in favor of mater-
nal custody, a mother who wants primary custody has considera-
bly more bargaining power relative to the father than she would 
in a state with a sex-neutral "best interest" standard. A new law 
creating a presumption against spousal support, on the other 
hand, would reduce the bargaining endowment of women as a 
class. To the extent that negotiated settlements simply reflect 
differences in bargaining power based on the legal rules them-
selves, no justification arises for a claim of unfairness in an indi-
vidual case. Instead, the state should consider changing the legal 
endowments. 
Second, bargaining is very much influenced by each party's 
preferences, i.e., how each party subjectively evaluates alterna-
tive outcomes. These preferences are not simply matters of 
taste. A party's economic resources and life circumstances mold 
them. The parties' relative bargaining power depends on how 
each spouse subjectively evaluates the outcome a court would 
impose. Consider, for example, the differences between the fol-
lowing two cases, each in a state where custody law provides for 
joint custody. If both the mother and father are indifferent to 
whether they have primary custody or joint custody, the per-
ceived endowments of the two parties are comparable. Now, con-
sider a case where the father likes joint custody better than his 
having sole custody. The mother, on the other ,hand, has a 
strong preference for her own sole custody over joint custody. In 
such circumstances, if the father knows the mother's prefer-
ences, he might be seen as having greater bargaining power than 
the mother because he could force on the mother his preferred 
outcome (joint custody) and thus could require her to compen-
sate him somehow if he is to accept some other arrangement. 
The relationship of each party's preferences to outcome is ex-
plored further below. 
A third element that affects bargaining concerns uncertainty, 
and the parties' attitudes towards risk. Often the outcome in 
court is far from certain, and the parties are negotiating against 
a backdrop clouded by substantial uncertainty. Because the par-
ties may have different risk preferences, this uncertainty can dif-
ferentially affect the two spouses. If substantial variance exists 
among the possible court-imposed outcomes, the relatively more 
risk-averse party is comparatively disadvantaged. 
A fourth element that affects bargaining relates to the differ-
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ential ability to withstand the transaction costs-both emotional 
and economic-involved in negotiations. A party who has no im-
mediate need for settlement, enjoys negotiations, and has plenty 
of resources to pay a lawyer, has an obvious advantage over an 
impatient opponent who hates negotiations, and cannot afford to 
wait. 
A fifth element concerns the bargaining process itself, and 
strategic behavior. In divorce bargaining, the spouses may not 
know each other's true preferences. Negotiations often involve 
attempts by each side to discern the other side's true prefer-
ences, while making credible claims about their own preferences 
and their intentions if a particular proposal is not accepted. 
"Bargainers bluff, argue for their positions, attempt to deceive 
or manipulate each other, and make power plays to gain advan-
tage. "23 Some people are more skilled negotiators than others. 
They are better at manipulating information and managing im-
pressions. They have a more refined sense of tactical action. 
These differences can create inequalities in negotiations. 
In short, negotiated outcomes depend in part on how each 
spouse evaluates the consequences of what will happen absent 
an agreement. Those evaluations are affected by both subjective 
and objective elements.24 This, in turn, depends not simply upon 
the legal endowments, but on each party's subjective evaluation 
of the outcome absent a negotiated agreement, and the probable 
transaction costs of a court-imposed resolution. I am skeptical 
about our ability to identify when parties have equal bargaining 
23. S. BACHARACH & E. LAWLER, BARGAINING: POWER, TACTICS, AND OUTCOMES 42 
(1981). Bacharach and Lawler suggest that "[t]he task of a bargaining party is to con-
vince its opponent that it controls resources, that the opponent needs the resources, and 
that it is willing to use power. These manipulative actions ultimately determine a party's 
bargaining power." Id. at 51. They believe "punitive tactics are central to bargaining as 
power itself . . . punitive tactics relate to the ability of one party to impose costs on the 
other party." Id. Some commentators have suggested a distinction between bargaining to 
give the other side as little as possible, and bargaining to get as much as possible for 
oneself. A mediator, according to some commentators, can encourage people to avoid 
spite and bargain for gains. The difficulty is that in the strategic game it is often possible 
to get more for oneself by making a credible threat to harm the other side. One reason I 
like mediation is because it tends to dampen strategic behavior. 
24. Bacharach and Lawler suggest that 
analysis of bargaining power ... requires a framework that (1) identifies the 
multiple dimensions constituting each party's potential bargaining power, (2) 
identifies the major types of bargaining tactics, (3) shows how the dimensions of 
bargaining power affect tactical action, (4) shows how tactical action can alter 
bargaining power, (5) examines the conditions under which given tactics affect 
the bargaining outcomes, and (6) examines how outcomes at any given time af-
fect potential power at later time. 
Id. at 47. 
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power. Nevertheless, to the extent that one spouse sees himself 
as lacking alternatives and as being dependent upon resources 
controlled by the other spouse, he might be said to be disadvan-
taged compared to his situation if he had better alternatives. 
The following examples illustrate these notions, and suggest 
why, even against a backdrop of "fair" legal endowments, some 
negotiated outcomes will seem very one-sided. 
Case 1 The Problem of Idiosyncratic Tastes- H and W, 
who are divorcing, have as their only assets $30,000 cash and an 
eighteenth-century French tapestry that cost $5,000 ten years 
ago and today has a fair market value of $10,000. In states with 
community property, a court must divide such property equally 
according to its fair market value. With an indivisible tangible 
asset such as a tapestry, the court has discretion to award it to 
either party, compensating the other with other assets, or to or-
der it sold and the proceeds divided. 
Suppose this particular tapestry has great sentimental value 
to H; he would, if necessary, pay $30,000 to keep it, even though 
he knows it has a fair market value of $10,000. If W knew this, 
then through hard bargaining she might end up with the $30,000 
cash, while H received only the tapestry. In such circumstances, 
H might resent that he had to "pay" $15,000 (his half of the 
community's $30,000 cash) to buy W's half of the tapestry. 
Nonetheless, he might prefer this negotiated outcome to the 
risks of litigation if he thought substantial chance existed that 
the court would award the tapestry to W and she would not re-
sell it to him. This example demonstrates how private ordering 
can lead to "one-sided" outcomes because the parties' prefer-
ences differ, even though the legal rule (here community prop-
erty) treats the parties as equals. In essence, because the hus-
band has idiosyncratic tastes, and attaches a higher-than-market 
value to this particular tapestry, what the parties bargain over is 
how to divide this surplus. 
This example illustrates a more general characteristic of di-
vorce bargaining. In many respects, it resembles a bilateral mo-
nopoly. In ordinary market transactions, one buyer does not 
have to do business with any particular seller because there are 
many others with whom to do business. In divorce, the spouses 
must negotiate with one another, unless one or both simply ac-
cept the consequences-both legal and practical-of the non-co-
operative solution where the court settles the dispute. Like a 
monopolist selling to a monopsonist, the two spouses (or their 
representatives) are locked in a dyadic relationship that they 
cannot easily avoid. One way or another, the distributional ques-
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tions concerning marital property, spousal support, child sup-
port and custody must be resolved. 
What consequences result from this bilateral monopoly? First, 
opportunities often exist for both parties to gain through a nego-
tiated resolution. Second, frequently one spouse may "take ad-
vantage" of the other spouse's preferences. Indeed, economic 
theory suggests that while the range of possible efficient ex-
changes can be specified, the actual bargain struck within the 
range eludes predetermination because of possible strategic in-
teraction. In this example, an efficient outcome requires that H 
get the tapestry, but the range of efficient outcomes might also 
give him anywhere from $0 to $10,000 cash in addition. The out-
come depends not only on the preferences of each party, but on 
each party's knowledge of the other's preferences and how the 
parties play the game. 
This last point can be illustrated using the same tapestry ex-
ample. Suppose a judge were to resolve the dispute by requiring 
one spouse to cut the cake (i.e., divide the property into two 
piles), and then having the other spouse choose the slice he or 
she prefers (i.e., picking a preferred pile).25 Assume H values the 
tapestry at $30,000, and W values it at $10,000. If the parties 
know each other's preferences, and no recontracting between the 
spouses can occur after the division, then the amount H pays for 
the tapestry will depend upon who gets to slice the cake. W 
could presumably put the tapestry and $1 in one pile, and 
$29,999 in the other pile. W would know that H would choose 
the tapestry and $1, because H values that pile at $30,001 and 
the other at $29,999. In essence, W could thus capture all the 
surplus. If H were dividing, on the other hand, he could create 
one pile with the tapestry and $9,999, and a second pile with 
$20,001 cash. He would know that the wife would choose the sec-
ond pile, and as a consequence he would have "bought" the 
wife's half of the tapestry for only $1 more than its fair market 
value .. Thus, he would have captured the surplus for himself. 
Where each spouse is ignorant of the other's preference, the 
25. There is interesting literature about the problem of dividing an object (such as a 
cake) among a finite number of people so that each is satisfied that he has received a fair 
share, although each may have a different opinion about which part of the cake is most 
valuable. See Steinhaus, Sur la division pragmatique, 17 ECONOMETRICA (supplement) 
315-19 (1949); Dubins & Spanier, How to Cut a Cake Fairly, 68 AM. MATHEMATICAL 
(1961). For valuation disputes in divorce, one commentator has suggested a process in 
which one party proposes a value, and then allows the court to award the object to either 
party at the value placed on it. C. Markey, California Family Law, 24, 45; see also King, 
Guidelines for Domestic Relations Cases 10 (San Francisco Super: Ct. 1977) (suggesting 
a modified bidding arrangement where divorcing parties cannot agree on value). 
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situation becomes more complicated. Under these circum-
stances, the one who cuts the cake suffers a disadvantage. For 
example, if W is completely ignorant of H's preferences and as-
sumes that his preferences resemble hers, then the only way she 
can guarantee herself one-half the value of the property is by . 
dividing the property into two parts that by her preferences are 
of equal value. Presumably one pile would contain the tapestry 
and $10,000 while the other pile would contain $20,000. In this 
way, no matter which pile H chooses, she will guarantee herself 
the equivalent of $20,000. With any other division, she risks 
ending up with less than half the fair market value if H's prefer-
ences are the same as her own. For H, on the other hand, to 
guarantee himself the value of the property (by his own prefer-
ences), he must place the tapestry in one pile, and $30,000 in the 
other. Only with this division is he indifferent about which 
choice W makes. With any less extreme split, he risks ending up 
with less than half the value (by his preferences) if W's prefer-
ences are the same as his own. 
Is it fair for W to be able to "exploit" H's idiosyncratic prefer-
ences by more than fair market value for her undivided interest 
in the tapestry? This normative issue does not seem clear. H 
might claim that ordinarily in a market economy a person enjoys 
any surplus value over market value generated by his own pref-
erences. Accordingly, H might claim that if W attaches no spe-
cial value to the tapestry, H should receive the entire surplus. 
W, on the other hand, might claim that she owns one-half the 
tapestry, and as owner may sell it for whatever price she can get. 
Surely, if H and W were strangers, W would have the right to 
refuse to sell the tapestry unless H paid $30,000 for it. 
Case 2 Economic Inequalities and Urgent Need- Consider 
now a second example, which I find more troubling, of one-sided 
agreements with "fair" legal endowments. H has substantial sep-
arate property and a high income. W has neither. Their only 
community asset consists of a house that H and W own outright. 
The housing market is currently depressed, and very few houses 
are selling. Realtors believe that they can sell the house within 
six months for between $150,000 and $180,000, provided the sell-
ers would accept a $100,000 ten-year mortgage at 12 percent in-
terest, which falls below the present market rate of 14 percent. 
H and W could sell this mortgage for $65,000, making the net 
present value of the house between $115,000 and $145,000. 
H knows that W is very short of funds and eager to move to a 
new city where she wishes to buy a condominium and start 
anew. Both Hand W recognize that without a negotiated settle-
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ment a year would pass before a court would require the home 
to be put on the market. When W asks H to buy out her interest 
in the home, H offers W $40,000 on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, 
saying that he would just as soon continue to own the house 
with W. W reluctantly accepts, because she believes that if she 
does not sell to H now, two years may pass before she can force 
the sale of the house, and get her equity out by reselling her 
share of the mortgage that is taken back. H and W both know 
that one-half of the present value of the expected sale price 
(taking account of the mortgage) exceeds $40,000, but no market 
exists for undivided one-half interests in residential real estate. 
If H doesn't buy her one-half interest, W must wait until a judge 
forces a sale of the house. Unlike the first case, where H decided 
to buy his wife's share of the tapestry at a price above the fair 
market value, in this case W has decided to sell for less than the 
fair market value in order to avoid the delays and inconvenience 
of an adjudicated result. 
Does this case represent one in which W accepted an "unfair 
price" because H exploited W's distress? Professor Eisenberg 
has suggested that in circumstances where one party "is in a 
state of necessity that effectively compels [her] to enter into a 
bargain with any terms [she] can get ... [n]either fairness nor 
efficiency, the two major props of the bargain principle," support 
enforcement of the deal.26 Eisenberg gives as an example an in-
jured traveler stranded in the desert who must bargain with a 
geologist to save his life. In Eisenberg's example, the traveler 
bargains for his life; here W bargains for the opportunity to start . 
a new life sooner. 
What is the appropriate remedy in such a case? If there is a 
preliminary review of this agreement by a court, should it be 
rejected by the court? Even if the wife is not objecting? After H 
has paid W, should she later be able to rescind the agreement? 
Should W be able to argue that H received unjust enrichment, 
and that she was entitled to the difference between what she 
actually received, and what was reasonably and justly due? 
In cases like this, the problem of exploitation arises not be-
cause of W's ignorance. To the contrary, her consent to this 
agreement is real. As Professor Dawson pointed out in his semi-
nal article many years ago, "the more unpleasant the alternative, 
the more real the consent to a course which would avoid 
it."27 The underlying issue concerns in part the question of what 
26. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 754-55. 
27. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 267 
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pressures a party can legitimately apply in bargaining, and how 
and whether the state should regulate the manner in which such 
pressures are exercised. No controversy would exist if W had 
shown that she accepted $40,000 because of physical threats by 
H. The doctrine of "duress" has traditionally permitted a de-
fense to the enforcement of a contract through threats of illegal 
conduct. In this case, however, H's conduct was not illegal. 
Nonetheless, H plainly took advantage of W's desire to sell 
quickly. One's appraisal of the morality of H's conduct might 
depend on an evaluation of whether he was somehow responsible 
for W's urgent need. In the first case, W was not in any sense 
responsible for H's preference for French tapestry. In this case, 
however, we may wish to treat Has responsible for W's distress. 
While I am reluctant to allow a court to evaluate the fairness 
of financial settlements in divorce bargains, the second case 
deeply troubles me. The various doctrines of contract law clearly 
permit intervention in egregious cases where inequality in bar-
gaining power has unjustly enriched one spouse. The underlying 
philosophical and jurisprudential issues remain difficult, but 
they do not, in my view, undermine the general reasons to favor 
private ordering, any more than the doctrines of duress or un-
conscionability undermine all of contract law. A variety of legal 
mechanisms exist to change the results of unfair divorce bar-
gains. For example, the alteration of bargaining endowments 
and the use of ex post review can serve to prevent unjust enrich-
ment brought about by morally unacceptable conduct. 
C. Externalities-Third Party Effects 
Third party effects provide the last set of reasons that justify 
limiting private ordering. A legal system that gives divorcing 
couples freedom to determine for themselves their postdissolu-
tion rights and responsibilities may lead to settlements that re-
flect the spouses' interests. But negotiated agreements can also 
have important consequences for third parties, and affect social 
interests that private negotiations fail to consider adequately. 
The economists' idea of "externalities"-the notion that in some 
circumstances market prices that affect the behavior of buyers 
and sellers will not adequately reflect the full range of social 
costs-has application here. In negotiating divorce settlements, 
the spouses may make decisions that have consequences for 
(1947). 
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third. parties which, if taken into account, would suggest some 
more: socially desirable settlement. 
A divorce settlement may affect any number of interests not 
taken into account in the spouses' negotiations. The state's fiscal 
interests can be affected, for example. The economic terms of 
the bargain between the two spouses may substantially affect 
the odds that a custodial parent will later require public transfer 
payments. 28 The most important third party effects concern the 
children, although externalities can exist with respect to other 
family members as well.29 At a conceptual level, one can easily 
see how a negotiated settlement may reflect parental preferences 
but not the child's desires or needs. From the perspective of 
spouses who negotiate their own settlements, marital property, 
alimony, and child support issues all basically present problems 
of money, and distinctions among them become very blurred. 
Each translates into present dollar values.30 Moreover, custodial 
arrangements can often be divided in a wide variety of ways. 
From a bargaining perspective, the money and custody issues in-
extricably link together.31 Negotiated settlements will certainly 
reflect parental preferences with regard to these money and cus-
tody issues. Generally, self-interested judgments will not solely 
determine these preferences. One hopes that parental prefe1·-
ences reflect a desire for their children's happiness and well-be-
ing, quite apart from any parental advantage. Nevertheless, 
some parents may engage in divorce bargaining on the basis of 
preferences that narrowly reflect their selfish interests, and ig-
nore their children's needs. For example, a father may threaten 
a custody fight over the child, not because he wants custody, but 
28. For example, ·a mother might decide to forego all alimony and child support pay• 
ments from the child's father in order to avoid any future relationship with him. If the 
father's resources were small, this decision might "cost" the mother and child very little 
or nothing, if public assistance payments make up the difference. Nonetheless, if the 
welfare system is premised on the private support obligation, the mother's decision (if it 
were binding on the state's power to claim reimbursement from the father) would have 
obvious effects on the public fisc. Indeed in this example, a solution that largely respects 
the private agreement is possible. The economic agreement made by the spouses can be 
effective inter se but can be treated as having no effect on the state's right to collect 
child support from the father. 
29. For example, visitation and custody agreements may reflect the parents' interests, 
but not those of grandparents and other family members. 
30. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 959-63. Although there are differ-
ences among the three elements with respect to termination and enforcement risks, the 
value of different bundles of the three elements can be compared. See id. 
31. Two reasons exist. First, over some range of alternatives, each parent may be 
willing to exchange custodial rights and obligations for income or wealth. Second, par-
ents may tie support duties to custodial prerogatives as a means of enforcing their rights 
without resort to court. See id. at 963-66. 
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because he wants to push his wife into accepting less support, 
even though this will have a detrimental effect on the child. A 
custodial parent, eager to escape an unhappy marriage, may of-
fer to settle for a small amount in order to sever relations soon. 
A custodial parent may negotiate to eliminate largely the child's 
contact with the other parent, not because of the child's wants 
or needs, but because the custodial parent despises his ex-spouse 
and wants nothing more to do with her. 
Concerns about the effects of divorce on children underlie 
many of the formal limitations on private ordering, e.g., the re-
quirement of court review of private agreements relating to cus-
tody and child support; the legal rules prohibiting parents from 
making nonmodifiable and binding agreements concerning these 
elements. In addition, the potential conflict of interest between 
divorcing parents and their children has led many to advocate 
the appointment of counsel for children, so that the children's 
interests can be directly represented in divorce proceedings. 
Over the years, numerous commentators have expressed the 
fear that courts rubber-stamp custodial arrangements in uncon-
tested divorces, and that this proves harmful for children. 32 In 
1968, for example, Judge Justine Polier complained: 
In the vast proportion of cases where divorce is not con-
tested, the question of the welfare of children, in terms of 
which parent has more to offer to their healthy develop-
ment, is not considered by the court . . . . Divorce is 
granted, and the children automatically go to the plain-
tiff, as benefits and burdens go with the land that is sold. 
The pre-divorce agreement between the parties may or 
may not reflect concern for the welfare of the children. 
The primary interest of one party in escaping the mar-
riage, or financial considerations unrelated to the sound-
ness of the custody or visitation agreements, control the 
disposition of the children. The mental health of the re-
spective parents, past anti-social behavior, and their abil-
ity to be parents are not subjected to scrutiny. 33 
I have written elsewhere on these issues,3' and I remain very 
32. See L. HALEM, D1voRCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND Soc1AL PERSPECTIVES 227 
(1980). 
33. J. POLIER, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY 113 (1968). 
34. See Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226; Mnookin & Korn-
hauser, supra note 1, at 950. 
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skeptical about the wisdom of assigning counsel for children in 
uncontested divorces,35 and the requirement of judicial review of 
negotiated settlements in all divorce cases involving children. 36 
These issues involve more than an assessment of the practical 
usefulness of various safeguards. They also relate to the funda-
mental issue of free choice: how should the power and responsi-
bility to define what is in the interests of children be allocated at 
the time of divorce? Who decides on behalf of the child? To 
what extent should the child's parents possess the freedom to 
decide how to allocate the responsibility for their children fol-
lowing divorce? 
When a divorce affects minor children, the state obviously has 
interests broader than simply dispute settlement. The state also 
has responsibility for child protection.37 To acknowledge this re-
sponsibility, however, is not to define its limits. Indeed, the criti-
cal' questions concern the proper scope of the child-protection 
function at the time of divorce and the mechanisms that best 
perform this function. 
I believe divorcing parents should maintain considerable free-
dom to decide custody matters-subject only to the same mini-
mum standards for protecting the child from neglect and abuse. 
that the state imposes on all families. The actual determination 
of what is in fact in a child's best interests is ordinarily quite 
indeterminate. 38 Such a determination requires predictions be-
yond the capacity of the behavioral sciences and involves impo-
sition of values about which little consensus exists in our soci-
ety. 39 It is for this reason that I conclude that the basic question 
is who gets to decide on behalf of the child. 
A negotiated resolution is desirable from the child's perspec-
tive for several reasons. First, a child's social and psychological 
relationships with both parents ordinarily continue after the di-
vorce. A process that leads to agreement between the parents 
rather than one that necessarily has a winner and a loser better 
ensures a child's future relationship with each of his parents. 
Notions of child protection hardly justify general judicial suspi-
cion of parental agreements; the state's interest in the child's 
well-being in fact implies a concomitant interest in facilitating 
parental agreement. 
35. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 988-90. 
36. Id. at 994-96. 
37. See Mnookin, supra note 34, at 229, 232. 
38. Id. at 255-62. 
39. Id. at 258-61. 
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Second, the parents know more about their child than will the 
judge, because they have better access to information about the 
child's circumstances and desires. Indeed, a custody decision pri-
vately negotiated by those responsible for the child's care after 
the divorce seems much more likely than a judicial decision to 
match the parents' capacities and desires with the child's needs. 
Parents, undoubtedly, occasionally make mistakes concerning 
custodial arrangements, but so do judges. More fundamentally 
(given the epistemological problems inherent in knowing what is 
best for a child), reason exists to doubt our capacity to know 
whether any given decision is a mistake. Therefore, the possibil-
ity that negotiated agreements fail to maximize the child's wel-
fare hardly serves as sufficient argument against a preference for 
private ordering. Moreover, because parents, not state officials, 
are primarily responsible for the day-to-day child-rearing deci-
sions before and after divorce, parents, not judges, should have 
primary authority to agree on custodial arrangements. This 
means that courts should not second-guess parental agreements 
unless the narrow child-protection standard implicit in neglect 
laws demands judicial intervention. Nonetheless, the state has 
an important responsibility to inform parents concerning the 
child's needs during and after divorce and an important interest 
in facilitating parental agreement. The law in action, which ac-
knowledges substantial parental power, seems preferable to ex-
isting doctrine, which imposes substantial restrictions on the 
parents' power to decide for themselves. 
Because primary responsibility for child-rearing after divorce 
does and should remain with parents, a strong presumption 
should favor the parental agreement and limits ori the use of 
coercive state power by judges or other professionals to force 
parents to act as the professional thinks best. On the other 
hand, I think the state has an important interest in encouraging 
parents to understand that the responsibility for their children 
extends beyond the divorce, that children are in many ways at 
risk during the divorcing process, and that in deciding about the 
child-rearing arrangements the parents have an important obli-
gation to meet their children's needs. Moreover, there is reason 
to think that by facilitating parental agreement, and helping the 
parents transform their old relationship into one in which they 
can now do business together with respect to the children's fu-
ture needs, the interests of the children are being served. 
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CONCLUSION 
From a legal perspective, separation and divorce pose four dis-
tributional issues, any of which may lead to a dispute between 
the spouses. These issues are: (a) How should the couple's prop-
erty-the stock of existing wealth, separately or together-be di-
vided? (b) What ongoing claim should each spouse have on the 
future earnings of the other? (c) What ongoing claims should a 
child have for his share of the earnings or wealth of each of his 
parents? (d) How should the responsibilities and opportunities 
of child-rearing be divided in the future? The legal system speci-
fies both substantive rules (i.e., marital property law, alimony 
law, child support law, and custody and visitation law) and a set 
of procedures that seek to resolve these disputes. 
I believe that the primary function of the legal system at the 
time of divorce is to facilitate private ordering-in other words, 
to provide a framework within which divorcing couples can 
themselves determine their postdissolution rights and responsi-
bilities against a backdrop of fair rules and procedures. My gen-
eral defense of private ordering depends on the ideal of individ-
ual autonomy and liberty and arguments based on efficiency and 
cost. At the beginning of this article, I emphasized that my de-
fense of private ordering was not premised on an absence of im-
portant social interests in how the process works or in the fair-
ness of the outcomes. The critical issues are ones of emphasis 
and degree: to what extent should the law permit and encourage 
divorcing couples to work out their own arrangements? Within 
what limits should parties make their own law by private 
agreement? 
While I have not attempted to answer these questions with 
any precision, or to define with exactitude the precise limits of 
private ordering, I have suggested three justifications for limita-
tions upon divorce settlements: (1) problems of capacity, which 
go to the issue of whether in a particular case one party has ex-
ploited the other party's inability to make a deliberative judg-
ment; (2) proplems in bargaining that may lead to unconsciona-
ble results, even if both parties are competent, and the legal 
endowments are generally considered fair; and (3) problems of 
externalities, where the concern lies with the impact of the nego-
tiated agreement on persons not represented in the divorce bar-
gaining process. 
My framework certainly does not make previously intractable 
family law problems disappear. But it does suggest an important 
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intellectual agenda for those concerned with dispute settlement 
and divorce. How do the rules and procedures used in court for 
adjudicating disputes affect the bargaining process that occurs 
between divorcing couples outside the courtroom? How do vari-
ous procedural requirements affect the parties' behavior during 
the time they are resolving various distributional issues, and 
thereafter? What rules and procedures facilitate dispute settle-
ment, and how do alternatives affect the future relationship of 
the former spouses to each other and to their children in subse-
quent years? In short, how do we best design rules and proce-
dures that respect personal autonomy by facilitating private or-
dering, and ensure fairness by establishing appropriate 
safeguards against the risks that incapacity or third party effects 
may lead to unjust results? 

